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THE NEOCLASSICAL ANALYSIS OF
EXTENIIAL ECONOMIES AND DISECONOMIES*
Introducton
The concept of external economies is one which frequently arises
in connection with the theory of economic development. The reason for
the importance attached to it is that the presence of external economies
under certain circumstances can drive a wedge between social and private
marginal products, resulting in deviations from the social optium in
a competitive system. This, in turn, may call for corrective govern-
mental interference.
The concept of external economies originated with arshall who
used it as an analytical device to explain production at falling unit
costs. With the advent of the theory of monopolistic coMetition, how-.
ever, a more legitimate analytical tool was created to handle such
phenomena, while the concept of external economies took on new impor.-
tance in arguments. concerning optimal allocation in a purely como.
petitive state and in socialist or planned economies. An increasing
weight was given to the divergences of social and private marginal
cost as an obstructive phenomenon to the decentralised achievement of
the ideal, and there was a tendency to refer loosely to divergences of
this nature as external soonomies or diseconomies.
*
The author is indebted for constructive suggestions and valuable
criticism to Professors R. L. Bishop, R. S Eckaus, and R. M. Solow,
Responsibility for the correctness of the ideas propounded in the paper
rests, of course, with him.
2The terms, external economies and diseconomies, properly include
a good number of phenomena which may or may not give rise to the above
mentioned divergences. Such are, for instance, situations involving
the Marshallian forward falling supply curve, technical interconnections
among firms, externalities operating directly on the consumer and even
the simple static adjustment mechanism of the purely competitive general
equilibrium model.
It should be mentioned at the very outset of this paper that the
recognition of the existence of certain types of externalities, far from
being helpful, has in the past been something of a "red herring" in the
analysis of optimal allocation. This is the case of pecuniary external
economies and diseconomies.
Pecuniary external effects operating on a firm in a general equi-
librium framework are, under all circumstances, the manifestations of
the workings of the general equilibrium systeA itself. In other words,
when the conditions underlying the general equilibrium system change,
the maximizing mechanism grinds out a new solution together with a
new set of prices, The change in prices, of course, will have an wx-
ternal effect on the decision-making of the competitive firm.
Pecuniary external economies and diseconomies refer to just one
variety of an infinity of possible outcomes of the adjustment mechanism.
As such, there is no reason whatsoever to suppose that they ever would
lead to misallocation, 2 barring the cases where the adjustment mechanism
1
A more detailed treatment will be given below.
That pecuniary external diseconomies are but transfer costs in a
purely competitive system, being instrumental rather than detrimental for
the achievement of the optimm, was the outcome of the well-known contro-
versy between A, C. Pigou and A. A. Young.
3is already crippled by a more basic factor, namely, output restriction.
In this latter case the blame should be properly allocated to those
elements of the syrtsn that are responsible for output restrictions:
monopolies and their competitive "pseudo-counterparta," firms operating
with technically interconnected production functions.
Those who attach a great significance to their existence in a
developing economy operate under the implicit assmption that the
process of economic development necessarily has to create a signifi-
cant number of socially uncontrollable monopolies and external tech-.
nological effects. This, of course, may be a valid assumption, but
the proper conclusion is that greater attention should be given to
the real cause of the divergences between marginal private and social
products such as the different types of output restrictions.
A last word of caution is in order in connection with external
pecuniary effects. The discussion of these effects involves the no-
tion of a straightforward functional relationship between the output
of the different industries and factor prices. For expository purpos.s-
and with silent theorizing--such functional relationships are used in
partial equilibrium analysis. They vanish, however, in a general
equilibrium setting, where depending on the nature of the shifts in-
volved, "anything can happen."
Since the concept of external economies, used in a vague sense
rather than in a rigorously defined form, is gaining importance In the
theory of economic growth, a precise analytical formulation of the is..
sue would be necessary to eliminate the present ambiguities,
1A more detailed treatment follows below,
1~
In the following an attempt will be made to present the concept of
external economies as conceived by neoclassical economists. This will
be done both in the context of partial equilibrium analysis and elfare
1
theory.
1. Internal Economies and Diseconomies of Scale
1.1 Though the aim of the paper is to clarify problems created by
external economies and diseconomies, it seems necessary at this point
to refer back to the forces underlying the slope of the unit cost ourve.
This has to be done for two reasons. One is the fact that the presence
of external economies in one firm may be the manifestation of internal
economies in another firm. Secondly, by integration, horisontal or
vertical, economies previously external to one or more firms can be
incorporated into the cost function (a phenomenon frequently referred
to as internalisation of external economies), and vice versa.
1.2 It is customary to refer to the average cost curve of a firm
in its generalised form as a U-shaped one. It is an empirical observa-
tion that as a firm gradually increases its output, its average cost
decreases due to factors which are comonly referred to as eonomies
of scale, There is, however, a critical output (more realistically a
critical range of outputs) where the economies of. scale are just balanced
by such diseconomies which accompany increases in production, From this
critical point (or range) average cost increases as production increases,
economies of scale being increasingly outweighed by the diseconomies.
1The exposition relies on considerable literature which, however, due
to limitations imposed by space, cannot be. discussed, In addition to those
who are noted in the text, the following important contributors should be
mentioneds W. J. Baumol, R. L. Bishop. H. S. Ellis, W. Fellner, T. de Scitovsky,
and P. A. Samuelson.
51.3 Non.-linearities in the cost function can be attributed to the
charecteristics and properties of inputs and processes, Most of the
causes underlying economies and diseconomies of scale can be described
in terms of
tt. indivisibility (lumpiness) of factors of production
b, interaction of production units (both physical and
organizational)
c. purely technological facts,
The above categories are by no means completely independent of each
other, Indivisibility, for instance, is clearly a technological fact.
Nevertheless, it is useful to differentiate between technological facts
of this nature, on the one hand, and those that are concerned with phew-
nomena such as the relation between diameters and volumes or relative
heat losses of a furnace.
The group of factors producing economies of scale, classified under
"interaction of production units," refers to the indivisibility of certain
productive processes, the law of diminishing returns, organizational ad-
vantages and disadvantages, etc. To illustrate, let us take a few examples,
Ecoromies of scale derived from the division of labor would originate
clearly from the causes listed under (a) and (b). Labor is not finely
divisible;1 consequently, a productive operation has to reach a certain
size before specialization can begin. Specialization in iteelf is not
onough, however, to result in economies of scale, It has to be stipulated
Labor (as al inputs and output.) is finely divisible if counted in
units per time, This is, however, irrelevant in the context of specializa-
tion where physical divisibility for any given time instance is required.
6that the interaction of specialized labor with the other productive
factors will result in a more efficient productive process than that of
the non-specialized labor.
Diseconomies of scale will always be present (sooner or later) when
one or more productive factors are fixed in quantity while others are
variable. Also organizational complications wil arise as the productive
process becomes more complicated (through specialization) and the volum
of production increases. Here again a differentiation can be established
between purely technical causes and interactions diseconomies of inter-
action would manifest themselves in the increasing inefficienoy of the
bureaucracy, while purely technical factors would act through phanoamma
such as the quadratic increase of communication lines as communication
points increase.
2. External Economies and Diseconomies
The definition given by neoclassical economists to external economies
and diseconomies refers to the effects of the total output of the industry
on the cost curve of the individual firm. More specifically, in the case
of external economies the cost curves of individual firms within the in-
dustry will shift downward as industry output increases, whereas in the
presence of external diseconomies the shift is in the opposite direction.
An objection can be made at this point against the use of the in-
dustry concept in this context. On the one hand, the concept of industry
suffers from ambiguity; on the other hand, it eems unduly restrictive
to limit the analysis of external economies to the reactions of individual
cost curves to the output of the industry alone and to exelude firms
outside the industry.
72.1 The shift in the cost curve, necessary for external economies
or diseconomies, is induced by a change in the data from which the cost
curve is derived. Cost curves are based on the current state of tech-.
nology and the prevailing market prices of the productive factors. A
purely competitive firm (acting as such both in the product and factor
markets) will not be able to affect the prices of inputs by its indi--
vidual decisions As a consequence, its manager accepts the prevailing
factor prices as given and bases his maximizing decisions on them. If
the price of an input changes, the optimal factor combinations will
changes and the cost curve shifts upward or downward (usually, however,
not in a parallel fashion).
Another alternative is that some existing interrelation between
the production functions of two or more firms, operating on the efficiency
of the productive inputs, will have an effect on the output of the indig
vidual firm. Whenever one of the technically interconnected firms changes
its scale of operation (output or factor quantities), the output of the
other firms also changes. The result is a shift of the individual cost
curves (even if factor prices remain constant).
Based on these alternative ways by which cost curves may shift,
Viner classified economies and diseconomies as pecuniary and technological.
Accordingly, pecuniary external economies and diseconomies operate through
changes in factor prices induced by shifts of the total demand for pro-.
ductive factors in response to a change in the output of the industry
(or any other firm in the econonsy). Technological external economies
and diseconomies operate through a change in the efficiency of the pro.
ductive inputs in response to a change in the total output of the industry
r
8(or any other firm), even if the prices of productive factors remain
constant.
It might be more appropriate, however, to reformulate the definition
of external technological economies and diseconomies in terms of the
productive factors rather than the output of the firm whose activities
give rise to these effects. In subsequent parts of the paper this
formulation will be adopted, unless otherwise specified. Such a cone
ception broadens the genesality of the notion by including a tech-
nological interconnections--those which operate through the output of
a firm and also the ones where the effects are the result of a different
choice of factor combinations. Accordingly, external technological
economies and diseconomies operate through a change in efficiency of
the productive inputs of a firm in response to a change in the total
quantities of productive inputs employed by the industry (or any other
firm), even if the prices of productive factors remain constant.
The difference between pecuniary and technological external effects
is readily demonstrated by the use of a mathematical model. Let og be
the average cost of the i-th firm producing the comidity 1,4 the
J-th factor 'employed in the production of xj, P3 the price of the j--th
factor and xk the product of the k-th firm. Then, using vector notation,
write 0 i u o (V, v ), P (x
vi.l. .i,.... n
3 P . . . P3 . . P
Xk xl, * ks * .
9This relationship states that the average cost of the i.-th firm is
a function of its output (function of technology) and the prices of the
productive inputs. The production function, however, stipulates in
addition to productive inputs also the inputs employed in the production
of the output of the k-th firm. The rationale is that if $ hanges
x will also change, either because of the direct influence of
(or xk) on the production of xj or, because a change in warrants a
reorganization of the productive factors in order to fulfill the re-
quirements of least cost production.
Prices of productive inputs are shown as functions of the outputs
of the other firms in the econow. If the total demand for inputs changes
as a consequence of the activity of the other firms, the prices of the
productive factors used by the i'.th firm will change.
The total change in c1 due to external effects (other factors being
held constant) is given by
dh '--xk dxk*
The first half of he right-hand side sum refers to technological,
the second half to pecuniary external effects.
1
It is important to realize that the functional relationship
Pi P (xk) is based on a good amount of implicit theorizing and serves
only expositional purposes. In the general multi-good case we have no
knowledge of what the properties of this function would be either in
a purely competitive or in a monopolistic situation. The same remarks
do not refer to the function describing technological interrelations.
Here, at least under ideal conditions, the exact form and properties
of the function can be stipulated.
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Pecuniary external economies will be present if
* 0 0
BP Xk
and pecuniary external diseconomies will be present if
These conditions hold since the first member of the product is always
positive and the second by assumption is negative for external economies
and positive for diseconomies.
The case of external technological effects is somewhat less straight-
forward. The sign of b will depend on whether production takes place
at falling or rising unit coat and is independent of external effects.
For this reason we can consider only the change of 3 with respect to S.
Thus technological external economies will operate if
0 1 k
and external technological diseconomies will operate if
Z i o. 1+ k.
Notice that in the case of external pecuniary diseconomies setting
equal to , we get monopsony power within the i--th firm.
2.2 Technological external economies and diseconomies are usuall
considered unimportant and rare in the neoclassical literature.- The-
examples given refer to the overcrowding of an unappropriated natural
resource (such as fishing) or excessive use of a public highway. Further
nexamples are given by Meade which are, in Scitovsky's terminology, some-
what bucolic in nature--concerning themselves with apples and bees and
forests and grain.
A somewhat different case of external technological economies is the
reorganization of the industiry when a certain size is reached (such as
the creation of a sales agency). This type of economies escape the
mathematical model presented earlier since that represents a firm as
an independent entity and does not show its relationship with the in-
dustry.
As opposed to the technological category greater weight was attached
to the pecuniary class, particularly to external pecuniary diseconomies.
Even in the case of pure competition where individual producers are con-
fronted with horizontal factor supply curves, the industry in its entirety
may well be able to affect factor prices causing the cost curves of the
individual producer to shift. This is even more so if the factor in
question is specific to the industry in the sense that the industry
might be emplo~ying a substantial part of the total factor suoy,
Pecuniary external economies refer to situations where an increased
demand for a factor results in a lower factor price. It is usual to
think in this context of factors (intermediate goods) which are produced
at falling unit cost (implying the presence of monopoly). It is, however,
objected-and justly so-that in addition to decreasing cost the shf6
of the ebmand curve has to be such as to induce an increase in output and
a willingness on the monopolist's part to share the benefits of falling
cost with the purchasing firm.
1It can be easily demonstrated that a rightward shift of the demand
curve may have perverse effects on the monopolist's profit maximizing
decision in the sense that the new output may be smaller rather than bigger
relative to the previous quantity produced-
Integration (horizontal or vertical) will transform external
eonrdes or diseconomies into internal ones. It is interesting to
note, however, that integration may change the character of the economies
or dise.concmies in question. Thus, a pecuniary external economy can be
transformedi into a technological internal economy by vertical integration.
The opposite is also true. Technological internal economies can be
changed into pesuniary external economies by vertical disintegration.
It is worthwhile to mention at this point the possible significance
of this change of character for the theory of economic development. The
process of development cn be thought of.-in an abstract and limited way--
as a process of continuous externalization of economies and diseconomies
through vertical disintegration. If one single firm is established in
an unindustrialized country, all stages of production will have to be
realized by this firm. It will have to create its own power, service
departments, etc. As more and more firms opE rate, an increasing number
of ser7ice and utility industries will take over the production of those
operations which previously constituted--to a varying degree-- an in.
tegral part of the productive activities of each indiviciual firm. The
process itself is vertical disintegration. The result is a continuous
change in cost structure where internal technological economies and dis-
economies are transformed into external pecuniary ones. Notice, however,
that such a view, abstract as It is, takes the creation of monopolies for
granted,
2.3 Exte-rnal economies or diseconomies shift the cost curves of the
indi vidual firms upward or downward depending on their relative strength,
and only in the borderline case, when diseconomies exactly offset economies,
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would the cost curves maintain the same position* The net manifestation
of external econonies and diseconomies in the industry supply curve is in
its downward or upward sloping character. A horizontal-industry supply
curve, however, does not necessarily imply the absence of external economies
and diseconomies; neither is an upward sloping industry supply curve a
neceseary implication of the presence of external diseconomies (cost
curves of individual firms may not necessarily be at an equal level)0
2.4 Reversible and Irreversible External Sconomies
The concepts of irreversibilities and reversibilities were con-
coived by Marshall.0  His notion was that certain external economies once
achieved by an increased industry output would remain effective, even if
output contracted again. Clearly such would be the case if more extensive
industrial activity resulted in the bettering of the skills of labor or
in other technical progress.
External economies manifest themselves in a downward-sloping in-
dustry supply curve. In this case an increase in demand decreases the
equilibrium market price. Such a representation, however, makes the
handling of the irreversibility problem difficult in a static framework.
It may be more illustrative, even if not more legitimate, to conceive of
a not negatively sloped supply curve shifting to the right in response
to a shift in demand in such a way that the new equilibrium intersection
is at a lower price than previously. If this operation works in both
direction, then the process is reversible (which it really has to be
under strict statiLcs). If it works only towards the right, then it is
irreversible,.
1The terminology itself is post-Marshalliano
34
Though Marshall was sufficiently vague about forward-falling supply
curve; and irrevrrsibilities, it is clear that he worried not only about
finding a explanation for production at falling unit cost alone but also
for th'e irreversible gains of urbanization, the coalescence of markets,
the clustering of producers around a labor pool, induced versus autono.
mous technological progress, and other phenomena necessarily dynamic in
character, There is little doubt that the importance of external economies
lies alIong precisely these lines and that the bucolic and other examples
thich fit into the framework provided by the a3sumptions of the neo-
classical analysin understate the significance of external economies0
3. Distortions Caused by External Effects in O2timal Allocation
Much of the discussion concerning external economies and diseconomies
is centered around the problem of divergences between private and social
marginal cost, Under what conditions will the different external effects
give rise to these divergences? The answer is provided by investigating
3ach external effect ir. the context of welfare analysis, For this pur-
pose tie assumptions on which the welfare system is constructed should
be spelled out carefully. In so doing, much of the misunderstandings
frequently encountered in the literature can be clarified.
3.1 Let us adopt the usual neoclassical procedure by separating the
problem of efficient production allocation from exchange conditions.
The usual neoclassical assumptions for dealing with problems of
production are:
1. given, fixed supplies of productive factors, invariant to
changes in factor prices which are allocated by firms
aceording to the rules of least cost production, subject
to limit-tions provided by the production functions
2. liven poductton functions hava a convex surface
7 Pure competition preveila in all markets
10 Tchnological external effects do not exist.
based u.pon the given factor supplien &nd production functions, we
construct an "Edgeworth box" where. the tangency of the isoquants will pro..
id9 ^he locus of eff icnt production points (,eneralized contract curve)o
The (tr-ing of efficiency- in this context is that holding all products
ut oua at a constant l it should not te possible to produce more
of thart cne good by a suitable rearrangement of the productive factors,
Along the contract curve the ratio of t .e marginal product of a
factor in the3 irst line of production to tha in a second line of pro-
ducti ' ill be equal to the ratio of the marginal product of any other
f:ct"'or in th. 'irst line of production to that in the second line of pro..
da.cticn. Te eiprocs. of this ratio is further equal to the ratio of
the mergi.nr1 cozst of the first good to that of the second good.
It is a theorem that under the aumptions stated, the mechanics
ofi pura ccrrpetitiVon w-ll always lead to efficient production guided by the
principle of profit M'Ximization, i.e., the firms will produce at a point
zn the geners.se d contract curve, where any increase in the output of
oe good n cessarily results in a decrease in the output of one or more
other goods,
A somiwhat simpler device than the generalized contract curve is the
trantnformatirn Curve (derived from the generalized contract curve)0  Pro.
d;cti on which takes place at any point other than defined by the transformation
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curve is inefficient, Pure competition will always lead to efficient
production, ie., at a point on the transformation function itself.
3.2 Differences between private and social marginal products.
With the assumptions 11sted above no difference can exist between
private and social marginal costs. This follows from the fact that each
firm's output depends only on the quantities of its own factors.
Let us now relax some of the assumptions listed under 3.1 and
investigate the ways by which discrepancies between the social and private
marginal product come into existence. Assume the existence of some tech-
nological interaction between two productive processes. The examples
given below will show t1heir effects on the maximizing decisions of the
managers of the processes.
Take first the following case where x, and x2 stand for the two
outputs, V1 and V2 for two different types of factors employed in the
two processes respectively. The factor V1 is not employed by the second
process; it is, however, shown in the production function of x 2 as its
presence has a beneficial influence on the production of x2 * The same
with V2 for the production of x1.
Then the following equations will denote the two processes:
X1 a F1 (V1 ; V2 )
X2 a F2 (V2 ; V1 ) 0
It is immwediately obvious that each factor will have a marginal
product in both, processes, whether hired or not, Thi's very fact is the
one which is the cause of the divergence between private and social
marginal producto
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In pure competition factors are so hired that the value of their
marginal product should equal their respective price. In our case, each
manager hires only one of the factors; the other factor, the presence of
which exerts a beneficial influence on the process, is hired by the
other firm respectively, In so doing--and Ln the absence of collusive
practices--aach ranager will calculate the value of the marginal product
of his hired fa1ctor based on its marginal productivity in the process
where it is employed, and he will neglect its marginal productivity
in the other process.
If P stands for product prices and PV for factor prices, then
the value of the factors social marginal productivity (VSMP) is defined
by
VSMPl & p F1 + p F
SP p F + 2. F2
M 2 x2 F2- ------ "
V72 V 2
and optimal allocation is achieved when
PV VSMP111
and P 2 VSMP2
2
Buat hiring is done, as stated previously, to fulfill the condition
P1 w PX 7; K VSMP
and P 2P F2  20V2 X- \)V SP
lt follows that the quantit . of' factors employed in both processes
is less than the socially desiri :ls amounto
A diffesrent: example, similar to the one provided by Meade is the
following case.
Two prxuction functions are given and the favorable effect of the
output of the other process is taken into account explicitly in each.
If xi and x2 stand for the respective outputs and V 1,2 for the factors
mploye..d, then
1Xl F, (V3 ; X2)
X y2(VJ2; x1)
J. E. Meade, "Fxternal Economies and Di4seconomies in a Competitive
Situation," Economic JWurnal, March 1952. Actually Meade gives an example
for his reciprocal interaction model which fits more the case of the inter-
acting factors described above than his own m;odel0  He conceives of an
orchard and a bee-keeping firm interacting in such a way that an increase
in the outpu.t of one affects the output of the other, which, in turn, has
its effect on the first, etc., etc., in an infinite converging series,
It is, however, the factors of production and not the respective outputs
which intercct0  If tho beekeeper increases the number of hives, more
apple blossoms will be fertilized, but the resulting increase in the out-
put of apples will not in any way affect the output of honey The op-
posite is also true. There is no infinite interaction series, though--
as in the case d4 scussed above-each factor, whether employed in bee-
keeping or in the orchard, will have a marginal productivity in both
processes, Though Meade's "real life example" does not quite fiflr"
model, his analysis of the model is accurate and stimulating. A com-
ment is in order, however, on the second part of his paper which refers
to what he calls the "creation of atmosphere0 " There is no real dis-
tinction between his model of creating atmosphere and his more general
models: it is nothing but a special case of the latter (having the
general form x a F(L, C) A(Z), where A(Z) is the "atmosphere factor").
The feature of the model, which lends it special character, is in the
form of interaction resulting in a change in the affected production
function such that the marginal rates of substitution between factors
zemain unchanged in the process. Actually, there is no reason to be-
lieve that a "change in atmosphere" would have no effect on the marginal
rates of substitution.
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Holding every factor constant but one in the first industry and per.
ritting the reciprocal technical interaction to operate freely, the mar.-
ginal physical product of the one variable factor is given by the following
expression
dxl~ ZV
A similar expression can be obtained for the total change in 32
with respect to the same variable factor employed in the first process
BF2 12 .
e -
The above expressions are nothing but instantaneous multiplierS
surning the infinite series of repercussions of reciprocal interaction
set into motion by hiring an additional unit of the variable factor.
To derive further conclusions, we have to assume now that the system is
stable. In other words, the growth of outputs due to interaction Maust
converge to a finite limit.,
1
The expression is obtained by totally differentiating both pro.
duction functions. The partials involving the factor3 held constant are
sero. The rest follows easily.
2The assumption of convergence and of favorable interaction imposes
the following boundary condition:
-aF F <1
0 < .- ~-(Nx2 x3.
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The aocial marginal product of the factor V* will consist of its
margiral products, taking repercussione into account, both in the production
of xi and th production of x2 . The. relevant equilibrium condition for
S social Timuml is then
P V.A* P P > VSMP 1o
SdV d
But ach sanager, with no concern for what good the factor will do
Itor tha cther process equates P T to the valuxe of the marginal product
of the factor based on its marginal productivity in the process where
it Is hired, Thus
P P dxdV y
d
and amount hired of the factor will be less than the socially desirable
amouni for proper.1 allocation,
BF 3F
Notic: tha. if either or -- are zero in the multiplier-
0 x2 CJ X
marginal roduct expression, then dx.l F1 In this case there is
dVA
no mutual interaction. However, the fact that one of the partials is
not zero indi cates that there is a one way interaction. It follows that
some factora must have marginal productivities also in the process where
they a'e nt employed, The analysis of this case is similar to the one
pr'eset.ed in the first example0
A shoild b4 mentioned that Svend Laursen in his mimeographed paper
distrib"xuted by the Center on Eternal Econoies in Economic Development
is in error when he claims thaTh eivgence between the social and pri-
vate marginll product is found in the fact that dx1 is greater than 1
dV
(see p,9) AatuaJly in the case of one-sided Interactions the two are equal;
in reciprocal interaction loses Its significance and the true private




3.3 The example of the technical interaction helps to understand
the problem in the framework of welfare allocation.
It was stated earlier that the condition of efficient allocation is
the equality of the rates of substitution, these being equal to the recip-
rocal ratio of the corresponding marginal costs. In a competitive
equilibrium each firm equates price to marginal cost. It is then tauto-
logical that the price ratio of two commodities have to be equal to the
ratio of the corresponding marginal costs. The ratio of the marginal
costs defines the slope at ench point of the transformation curve, and
it follows that the price line has to be tangent to the transformation
curve under conditions of efficient allocation. This condition is
automatically achieved by universally operating pure competition
(under the stated assumptions) since the conditions of competitive
equilibrium are identical with those defining the equality of rates
of substitution for each individual and each factor of production.
This implies in effect that marginal social costs have to be equal to
marginal private costs or, in other words, it is indifferent whether
we equate the ratio of marginal social costs or marginal private costs
to the respective price ratios, since the optimum will be reached in
exactly the same way. The conclusion, as stated earlier, holds o if
the proper assumptions are valid.
We have demonstrated the way divergences between marginal private
and social products come about when technological interaction exists among
two firms. Similar divergences will be created by monopoly and monopsony
influences which will be discussed in paragraphs below
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The cause of the divergences is in the system's inability to con-
pensate or penalise those marginal activities of individuals (executed
wilfully as in the case of monopoly practices or unwittingly as in the
case of external technological economies) which are desirable or un-
desirable for the social whole.
The d ivergence and its effect can be represented in the simplified
case of a two-dimensional diagram where the price line cuts across the
transformation curve rather than being tangent to it.
Assume now that production takes place at a point on the transformation
schedulel and that the good on the horisontal axis is being produced under
conditions where its marginal private cost is relatively higher than its
social equivalent (as was the case in the example given under 3.2). The
price line under these conditions will be steeper than the slope of the
transformation curve at the point of production. If the marginal social
cost, on the other hand, is lower than private marginal cost, the price
line is less steep than the slope of the transformation curve at the point
of intersection.
X1
External technological economies External technological diseconomies
lThis will be the case if the factor market is competitive.
23
Though under these assumptions there will be no unemployment and
factor allocation is efficient in the purely technical sense (one of the
goods being held constant, the other one is maximized), however, the
nation:al product is not maximized in terms of value,
Mthematically if the transformation curve is defined as
T( x, x2) 0
the ratio of the social marginal costs will be
Z T B T
where T and T2 represent the derivatives and --- 0
The optimum output will be achieved wherc
T P
T2  P2
At this point factors are allocated efficiently and the value of the total
product is maximized. Should the private marginal cost of Xl exceed its
social marginal cost, then
T 1< P
T2 P2
If private marginal cost is smaller than social marginal cost, then
Ti> P
T2 P2
Having reached this far in the analysis, it might be useful to complete
the system by including demand conditionso The price ratio 1, of course,
P2
1Assume independent consumer tastes and rationality in maximizing
satisfaction for each and every individualo
is not a given but the outcome of the general equilibrium mechanism.
E.quilibriun urill. be reached at a point where the marginal rate of trans-
formatior (The slope of the transformation curve) is equal to the marginal
:.rste ofbstitution (the slope of indifference curves) for each and
oivery Individualc The slope of the budget line being tangers to both
the traneformaticn curve and the highest attainable indifference curve
of each indiv-iA::ldelnes the price ratio _., Under such conditions
p 2
ach person's sadfaction is maximized.
it is again a theorem that unversally operating pure competition
ill lead to a result which satisfies the conditions of double tangency.
It was demonstrated that technological external effects within
the system violtee the optimal production conditionao It follows
that the condition of double tangency cannot hold either with the re-
sult that the satisfaction of some individuals could bu increased with-
out dindnishing the satisfaction of the oth0hers. This is so even if the
pr:ce rtio angential to each person's Indifference curve at the point
where the price line cuts through his transformation function (so that
factor allocation is efficient technologically)0
344 It was mentioned at the very outset of this paper that external
pecuniary effect:. by themselves do rot give rise to divergences between
the private and social marginal ratios. Notice also that the absence
of external pecuniary effects was not required among the assumptions
listed under 3.1; a social optimum could still be reached by competitive
means, Certain types of external pecuniary effects were assumed away
implicitly: those which are based on the production of an intermediate
good at falling unit costs or on monopeony power of individual firms
are ruled out by the assumption of universal competition,
Other external pecuntary effects still remain and operate without
being detriental to the competitive achievenient of the social optimum.
Consider the fal"lowing argument. An increase of output in one of the goods
in response to a change in demand will probably result in bidding up the
p rices of c orne of the inputs needed for the production of the increased
output (espoeially the price of the factor specific to the production
Of the good in question)c The changes in factor prices are necessary
the transfer olf factors from one occupation into the other. Thus
pecunary external diseconomies operating under such assumptions are
astrumental rathir than detrimental to the achievement of the optimum.
('t imary be mentioned that should the cortracting industries release every
factor at the sent rate as the expanding one employs them, no change in
factor prices needs to take place0 )
35 If the adjustment of the "reai" factors of the economy are
hamrpereid by the output restriction caused by technical interconnections or
monopoly practices, the change in the price system (resulting in external
po.cuniary effetacts) reflacts the fact that the equilibrium, subsequent
to a change in basic data, is not optimal Since external pecuniary
iuects of thai detrimental kind are usually associated with monopolies,
let us briefly exantine their effect on the equilibrium system.
It is a '.-ell-known fact that a monopoliat restricts his output. In
dociding the proper quantities of factors to be hired, he equates the mar,
,,nal revnuoe product (marginal revenue times the marginal product) of the
f ator to its price. The consequence is lower employment than would be
de iirable from the social point of view,
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Notice the striking similarity between wilful monopoly behavior and
the urwitting practice of technically interconnected firms. Both employ
lass of their factors of production than the quantities necessary for
optimal allocation, guided by the equation of the price of the factor
to marginal magnitudes which are not the socially desirable ones 0
The diagrammatic representation of monopoly effects (assume that
the good on the horizontal axis is produced under monopoly practices)
i identica,. to that of external technological economies0  If pro-
duction takes place under conditions of efficient technical allocation,
.he price line will be steeper than the slope of the transformation
curve at the point of intersection,
1
Since a monopolist can produce in a phase of increasing returns and
the presence of external technological effects may imply that purely com-
petitive industries have a forward-falling supply curve, it is relevant
andi important to investigate the effects of increasing returns on the
transformation curve. It is customary to show the presence of increasing
returns by the concavity of the transformation curve partially or through-
out its whole range. It is also customary to refer to a convex trans-
formation curve as one reflecting increasing costs. The convexity of
the transformation curve implies, however, increasing costs in terms
of one commodity which has to be given up in increasing quantities when
the other commodity's production is increased by equal increments(assuming
tech icaly efficient allocation). It reveals, however, only little about
the properties of the underlying production functions both of which can
be in a phae of increasing returns to scale in spite of the convexity
of the transformation function. A simplified proof of this proposition
is given in the Appendix0
Given a concave transformation curve pure competition can maintain
a stable equilibrium at other than vertex points _ if the concavity is
the result of technological external interactions. Otherwise, pure com-
petition would always result in rushing to one or the other vertex points.
It follows that in the case of technological external economies the mechanics
of pure competition may result in minimi zation rather than maximization.
To avoid the added complications created by concam transformation curves
in welfare analysis, all situations discussed in the following pages refer
to convex transformation curves (even though the underlying functions may
operate in a phase of increasing returns to scale)o
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The Rnonopolist's range of operation is thus restricted to the region
iich is bcanded by the origin and the point of optimum output. Within
e bounded ragion the monopolist will choose to operate at that point
u ware his p rofits arei maximizedo
The Functioning of External Effects in a General Equi-
3-,6 When i.nereasing costs or constant returns prevail throughout the syster,
external pcecuniary effects of the detrimental kind cannot existo Tech
nAological external Gcononies, however, can voll be present. As demonstrated
earlier, the quantities produced will be under the socially desirable
amounts ifn the presence of these economies vnless communal management
is possible, This, in turn, may result in monopolistic practices. The
question can be posed whether monopoly activIty or competitive production
i.s preferable unier these circumstances. In both cases the respective
outputs ar below the socially desirable amount. Mnopoly may be de-
sirable if the monopolist's output is nearer to the optimum than would
be the outpat of the pure cometitors, This is the more so since monopoly
can be made to "behave" with relatively simple measures whenever the
intersection of demand and marginal cost is above the unit cost (which
is the caae now by the exclusion of increasing returns).
1
This statement has to be modified to exclude monopolies. Shifts
of demand for the monopolists product can be such that an increase in
quantity produced may be sold at a reduced price, even though the monopo-
list produces at increasing average cost. The statement thus refers to
the traditional type of external pecuniary economies which may exist if
an intermediate good used by a competitive firm is produced on the falling
segment of the average cost curve.
2 The problem of subsidies does not ariseo
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An alternatAve possibility is that one of the outputs is produced
under monopoly, wherea4. the other under pure competition and with the
presence of external technological economies. If the assumption is made
that the level of total employment is fixed in society, then the output
estriction practices of the monopolist may increase the competitive
outputs towards the optimum.
Thera are several combinations possible, even within the framework
of a two-outcput econor, of the interaction of monopoly and external
,4echnological econoimieso While some of them will further increase the
deviation from tha optimum, others may well act to offset already eisting
discreparcies between the marginal social and private products.
3,,7 If onc of the processes works in a phase of increasing re-
-.urs, w know that the iaximizing decisions of the firm are of the
monopolistic kind, It is usually in this connection that external pecu-
niary economis a cre attributed the ability to drive a wedge between
social aid private marginal ratios. Notice, however, that the wedge
i3 there :from the very beginning in the formn of monopoly activities
The external pecuniary economies are nothing but the manifestations of
an already crippled equilibrium mechanism, If the monopolist is made
to "behav" (equate price to marginal cost), the external pecuniary
effects are also made harmless,
In order to investigate the nature of the case, we write that the
cost of i-th firm is a function of its own output and of the price of
the intermediate good (P ) which, in turn, depends on the quantity of z
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produced01 The assumption is made that shifts in demand for z are such
which bring about an increase of production and a lowering of prices
with the monopolist. Accordingly,
e W ci(xi; Pz)
with .... 0 0
It should be explained that P , even without specifying it as
in the equation above, is already implicitly present in the function being
one of the parameters, Bringing it into the relationship explicitly, we
establish P as a regular variable. A change in P,, of course, will re-
sult in a different choice of factor proportions. The final effect is
the change in the shape of the cost curve accompanied by a vertical shift.
Under competitive long-.run equilibrium, each individual firm will
produce at the minimum unit cost pointo From the well-known relationship
dCj .de
d-- ci + x
we know that at this point marginal cost equals average cost, since a a 0.
With the admission of one of the factor prices, P1, as a variable,
the minimum unit cost and the position of the marginal cost curve becomes
1For the economies to operate, two industries have to ecpand their
outputs simultaneously which is incompatible with efficient technological
allocation in the two good case0 The analysis can be extended to include
a third good0 Here the expansion of one of the industries accompanied by
the industry producing an intermediate good will be executed with a
rimultaneous decrease in the production of the third good, However, this
is a system the properties of which are not known to us,
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a less straightforward proposition. Thus
de. Ci +Z0ci dPz
Subatituting into the marginal cost relationship, we have
dC /;,C bC dP3
dxi Z ~xi CPS dxi J0
We immediately see that at the point where 2 0 i equals zero,
O Xj
marginal cost wilU not equal unit cost, We know that must be
dP
positive and by previous assumption -. has to be negative0  The signdxi
of the product consequently is negative. It follows that "true" marginal
cost imt bo smaller than unit cost at the point where equals ero.
Also, where marginal cost is smaller than uniA, cost, the latter must
have a negative slope0
The competitive output will not under these circumstances result in
an optimal quantity. Easch individual firm will equate price to the "partial"
marginal cost, But even if every firm in the industry would recognize the
(xistence of external economies, they would not increase their output to
the proper quantity unless subsidies were provided to offset the losses.
W3 have seen in the case of technological external economies that in
the absence of direct government interference, monopoly may be preferable
to pure competition. This is decidedly not the case with pecuniary external
economies. The purely competitive industry restricts its output; nevertheless,
industry output will expand until the profit of the individual firms is
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Substituting a monopoly, the equilibrium output would necessarily
bze smaller (assuming profit maximising behavior). This must be so since
the monopolist would equate marginal revenue to marginal cost instead of
price to average Cost (an done by the purely competitive industry).
Since two inductries in the system produce below the socially doe.
Arable amrount, it follows that, assuming technologically efficient allo-
cation, the third industry will produce more than the optimum. If this
industry is transformedt into a monopoly by horizontal integration, the
su3bsequent restriction of output and release of factors may result in
the expansion of the other two industries in the direction of the social
optimtum.
A sird lar case to that of monopoly can b e established for the presence
of monopsory Monopsony in itself will create a discrepancy between the
private and social rarginal product 0  Care should be taken, however, to
differentiate between monopsony power exercised by a single firm as
against a purely competitive industry's ability to affect factor prices.
In the case of tho latter no harm is done to the attainment of the social
optimum: each firm within the industry equates the value of marginal
product of the factor to its price. The monopsonist-one single firm.
faced individually with a rising factor supply curve will take advantage
of the situation by restricting employment to the intersection of the
value of marginal product of the factor to its marginal cost (which is
higher than its price). The restriction in employment gives rise to
distortions to the social optimumo
Monopsony practices may result in external pecuniary diseconomies
to a firm ubich obtains an inte)rmediate good from the monopsonist. This,
however, i , by no mean.i certain and it will depend on the elasticities
of dean- and on the nature of the shift of demand involvedo
tfnopsony cn be and usually is exercised in conjunction with
monopoly, ,T Ve folowing inequalities given by Joan Robinson' sum up
the different altrtives:
VMPCF MRPy * Ep- PF
Chere VMPF stds for the value of the mar'giral product of a factor,
RPF f.or its marginal revenue product (marginal physical product times
narginal reve-1nue at the corresponding leveal of production), MCF for the
marginal cost of the factor and PF for its market price or wage. The
left-hand ieA rae fers to the monopoUstic whereas the right-hand side
Nfers to the mon:>ponistic exploitation of the marketo
Though the different combinations may give rise to several ways by
wfhich discrepancies between the social and private marginal product can be
ceated, whic.-h, turn, may have external effects on other firms in the
syvstem, ;.e %ibject will not be further discussed. The analysis involved
13 bimilar to that presented for external pecuniary economies created by
onopolies, complicated by the assumptionr which have to be made about
demand elasticities,
to hternal Effecta, ariableFactor e, haning Production
The previous discussion referred to situations where the total
supply of each factor and the state of technology was held invariant. Let
us consider cases now where both the total supply of factor and production
1 The terminology used here is not Mrai Robinson'so
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functions may undergo changes0  Under these assumptions, if universally
pure competition prevails (and technical interconnections between pro-
Cuction functions do not exist), the mechanics of pure competition will
lead to the social optimum much the same way as in the previous situation,
4ol Ono of the important externalities underlying a forward-falling
vupply curve may be analysed in this connection. It is a well-known
argument (which originated with Marshall.) that as output increases in
the economy, the skill of the labor force also increases This is, of
course, c dynamic argument, but in the subsequent analysis an attempt
will be made to present it in a static frameworko
The example of 'increasing skills is an interesting one. It is well
suited to dmonstrate the essence of the difference between technological
Pnd pecuniary external effects and some fallacies to which careless
reasoning may lead.
A change in the skill of labor can be analysed in two ways. One
alternative is that we assume, production functions given, a fixed
physical supply of labor which we convert into "efficiency units" computed
by the use of some index based on marginal productivities. When skills
increase, the supply curve of labor in efficiency units shifts to the
righto
Such an approach, however, is a misleading one (for reasons which
will be discussed in a moment) and the notion of efficianty units is
ill-defined0. So let us turn to the second alternative.
We shall define the production function in such a way that with each
change in the skills of the labor supply a new function becomes relevant,
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while the total rupply of the factor remains invariant. This means
thlat as skills change, the isoquants of the function will shift re-
flecting the various new combinations of inputs which will lead to
the production of different specified levels of outputs. In this
process icoquanti are so rearranged that the corresponding outputs
p. roduced by identical factor combinations will be greater after than
,hose before the change in skill. The fiial result it something
aimilar to Hi1cks7 labor saving innovation,
Let uu investigate now what the external effect consists of and
how it comes a.bout, Aasume that to each level of total output, there
corresponds a certain level of skill, When the econong expands (due,
uay, to a phrsical increase in the supply of an input), the level of
production increases and with it the level of skills of the labor force,
I is clear that the totality of firms in the process of increasing
the production of the different marketable outputs also produces a
nonmarketable output: skills. The creation of skills, in turn, affects
each firi s production function in the aboves discussed manner.
The productive factors engaged by each firm will have a marginal
productivity in terms of the good in the production of which they are
amployed. They also have a marginal productivity in terms of all other
products, the production functions of which are affected through the
mnarginal coitributions of these factors to the general level of skills.
Each manager, however, as demonstrated in the discussion of external
technological economies, will disregard whatever marginal productivity a
factor may have in the production of other goods and computes the value
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of its marginal product based on its marginal productivity in the process
liere it is erployed. The result is that the distribution of labor among
the different firime will not be the same as the socially desirable one.
Labor saving innovations (such as the shift in production functions
in response to a change in skills) will have, of course, pecuniary effectt
In a one good, two factor economy, it will decrease the relative or
absolute share of labor in the distribution of the total product (unless
the other factor is redundant). With the change in relative or absolute
shares, factor prices will also change which, in turn, will have its
effect on the cost curves* Since the shift of cost curves is due to
factors external to the firm, the shift can be attributed to external
pecuniary economies or diseconomies. The effect of these external
pecuniary economies or diseconomies can be analysed exactly the same
way as we have done it in earlier paragraphs.
Let us consider now what we have demonstrated above. Due to changing
skills the firms experience two types of external effects: one is tech-
nological (cperating on the production function), the other is pecuniary
(operating through changes in factor prices),
It is most important to realize that the distortion in welfare
allocation is due solely to the distortions caused by the technological
external interaction. Whatever distortions the external pecuniary ef..
fects may have are reflections of the fact that the allocation of factors
among the firms is already distorted due to the technological interaction.
If the latter are offset by appropriate taxation or subsidies, the pecuniary
external effects are nothing but the tools of the general equilibrium
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mechi Aism adjuastlng to the shifting of the production functions.
lotice that technological e: iternal effects have taken over
the :lAe of monc -polc a in creatin ig conditions which result in pecuniary
exte: sal eff3at of the distorting typeo
At the ou.4r:set of this section it was mentioned that there is an
alte ative way to analyze the problem of increasing skills, and the notion
of a supply ,urve in efficiency units -tas establishedo It was also men-
tior ri that the analysis based on the efI'i ciency supply curve (which is
an i .l-defined concept anyway) might be mJsleadingo Here is the reason.
As t. e eff'iciency supply of labor shifts due to a change in total output
in the economy, the marginal product curve of labor (in efficiency units)
will shift, This alters factor prices (relative or absolute) and the
firm's coat functior, undergoes a change die to external pecuniary economies
or diseconomies. So far, so good. In this type of analysis, however,
no mention is made about the technological interconnections among the
firms. The careless conclusion is easily reached here that external
pecaniary effects are cause for welfare distortions. The distortions
caused by the technological misallocation are camouflaged by the shifting
efficiency supply curve,
Conclusions
The paper aimed to demonstrate the workings of the pecuniary and
technological external effects within the setting of the neoclassical
framework. It was demonstrated that pecuniary external effects are no
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rea. cause to welfare misallocation, and inasmuch as they lead to distor-
tions, they do so only because the general equilibrium mechanism is al-
ready disturbed by the presence of more basic factors, These are
trnopolies and technological external inter;, annections among the pro-
duction functions of the different firms. In the absence of the latter
pecuniary extrnal cffects are nothing but the manifestations of the
general equilibrium adjustment mechanism.
For thi3 reason it seems to be important to approach the problem
fromt the viewpoint of productivity rather than cost. If the social
optimum is not achieve6, the investigation of the causes should focus
an the practico-s of the monopolies and on the fact that certain productive
factors may have margiral productivities in other than those processes
where they are hired,
Monopolies a:nd purely competitive firms operating under the influence
cf external technological effects have sromething in common, Both restrict
their outputs (employment) below the socially desirable. The monopolist
does this by equae'ing the marginal revenue product of the factor, rather
than the value of its marginal product, to the price of the factor. The
pure competitor, on the other hand, does not take into consideration the
marginal product of his factor in other lines of production when computing
the value of its Yarginal product. The result is similar.
The solution is in penalizing or rewarding (whatever the case may call
for) those nmrginal activities which lead to Misallocation. Benevolent col-
lusion under the circumstances may be desirable. Just as two monopolists
(producing complimentary goods) can enter into collusive practices hbich will
increase both the welfare of consumers and their own profits, pure com-




The production functions of purely competitive industries--under
certain assumptioas-are homogeneous of the first order. Technical
interaction betwen firms and industries will change the character of
the functions by creating increasing returns to scale.
While purely competitive firms cannot produce on a falling segment
of the average cost curve, monopolies can. This, in effect, implies that
the monopolist may produce in a phase of increasing returns to scale in
the production function.
If increasing returns to scale prevail in both industries of a two
good two factor model., what right do we have to assume a convex trans-
formation fu.nction?
In the following pages it will be demonstrated that it is possible
to have a convex transformation function, even though both production
functions underlying it operate in a phase of increasing returns. Before
giving a more detailed demonstration, consider the following non-rigorous
heuristic argument.
It is a well-known fact that, given two homogeneous functions of the
first order, tha resulting transformation function may demonstrate strong
convexity, By renumbering the isoquants of the two functions in such a
way that the resulting increasing returns to scale are infinitesimal in
both, the corresponding transformation function will undergo a change0
Based on the notion of continuity, however, we instinctively know that a
2transformation curve with strong convexity ill not suddenly assume a
concave shape following this operation.
Lot us tirn now to a more rigorous demonstration of the same proposition
by establishing sufficient conditions.
Assume 0.he .estence of two production functions, both of them
homogeneous of order greater than one, and tw'o factors of production,
the supply of which is given.
x a F(Lx, CX), with the property \n x F(\Lx,\C1 ); n> 1
- c(-,-, cca --- I..- G(\(-L) (C.-C )); n) 1
x yL a LX + 14
C a CX+ C y
Let us form the Edgeworth box, the sides of which conform to L and C.
The efficert points of production will be defined by the "efficiency locus,"
ie.,. the lcus of the points of tangencies of the respective isoquants.
By the asumption of homogeneity, we know that the efficiency locus
1ill be a monotonically increasing function of L. and will lie at either
side of the diagonal of the box without crossing it. It may have, however,
an inflection point which, for the sake of simplicity, we rule out.
If x is the good produced by labor intensive methods, then the
generalized contract curve is formalized by
C. a 6(L )
end the condition of monotonic increase without inflection is given by
CX d+ d2
.0.0m -0 for all L .
xdL
3The geometric representation is found in the folloi ng diagram.
4-Cyy
Along the efficiency locus for each capi tal-labor ratio (defined by
the slope of a straight line drawn from the x origin to any point of the
contract curve), there exists a unique quantity of z produced. This fol-
lows from the pro;perties of the 4(Lx) function
Thus
x - x ) -
As x is a function of CX and C of Ly, it follows that x is a function
of Lx alone along the contract curve.
CEach .2 designates a unique quantity of C. and L, along the contract
etqrve, Giveu1 fixed factor supplies, the residuals will fix for each
C
unique quantities of I and C In effect, for each C there will be a
unique quantity o4 y produced along the contract curve--also a function of






d xIf x is a monotonically increasing convex (--, ( 0)
dL1
functiona of and Z is a monotonically decreasing concave
0) function of L., then the transformation func-
ti on bew een i and Z hs the property that < 00
In the limit both x and y may be straight line functions
of L for the, theorem to hold,
The geomtric representation is given by the following diagramse
~ i I
To demonstrate the validity of the theorem, two propositions have
to be verified.,
LeggI: x and g can be functions of such as
described by the theorem, even though the respective
production functions are homogeneous of order greater
than one.,
Lemnta Il: there exists a relaitionship between the
properties of Fl(Lx), F2 (tx) and T(x,y) such as to enable
us to predict the properties of the latter based on
the properties of the former.
To verify Lemma I, let us recall that in our example x is a labor-
intensive commodity (there is no loss of generality in this assumptiont
if x is capital intensive, an analogous argument can be coined). Let
us also remind ourselves that along any ray from the origin x is pro-
duced under incre'asing returns to scale. The contract curve, however,
is so defined that for each x there belongs a different -. which
am LX
increases as x increases. In other words, as the production of x
increases and factor proportions are so adjusted that the conditions
of efficient allocation are observed, the labor intensity of the pro-
duction is gradually watered down by adopting increasingly capital
4 Cintensive methods. As we increase the production of x and with it ,
x
the marginal rate of substitution of capital for labor also increases.
C
In effect, with each successive adaptation of a higher X the amount
of capital, which one would have to give up in order to stay on the
same isoquant if labor were substituted for it in equal increments,
increases. If the successive increase in the marginal rate of substi-
tution is significant and the order of the homogeneous function is only
slightly greater than one, it follows that as It increases, X will in-
crease but at a diminishing rate. This proves thatepart of Lemma I
1
which refers to x as function of .
The proof for the limiting case, where x is a straight line function
of LT9 follows readily from the above0
6As the corresponding proof for the statement concerning z is readily
found by essentially similar reasoning, the completion of the proof of
Lemma I will be left to the interested reader.
If we have reached this far, then we are almost home. The proof of
Lemma II and with it the proof of the theorem is readily found.
The mark of convexity in the transformation function is that as the
production of one of the goods is successively increased by identical
uantities, the production of the other good decreases by increasing
amounts. (In the continuous case the limit of the increments is taken.)
Does the above property hold in our case? It most certainly does,
To demonstrate this the elegant way, assume that x is a straight line
function of L, (the limiting case) and y is a concave d4 >0) function
dL1
of Lx. The proof of the more general case, in which both functions are
non-linear, readily follows from this special case,.
Let us push along the efficiency locus from the origin of x towards
the origin of y in successive steps such that the length of each step
is deterrdned by an identical increment in LXQ
In terms of the production of x this will mean identical increments
for each succeasive equal increment in L For the production of Z the
equal incremcents in T imply successively increasing decrements. This
proves the convexity of the transformation functign for the special case,
What about the general case when x is a convex ( < 0 ) function of LdL;
In this case as Lx is increased by equal increments, the corresponding
increments in x will be successively diminishing: a phenomenon which
further reinforces the convexity of the transformation function. This
7completes the proof of the theorem.
Having reached this far, it is worthwhile to point out the following
interesting corollary to our theorem.
Corollary: If the production functions of x and I
are homogeneous of order greater than one, and the para-
metric equations are both straight line functions, then
the resulting transformation curve will be also a straight
line function. This is so, even though the efficiency
locus is convex and not a straight line.
The proof of the Corollary follows straight from the proof of the
theorem and does not need separate treatment.
